Keywords
partisan cycles
public policy
How to Cite
Abstract
Does ideology matter? This article examines income inequality as a dependent variable— an uncommon approach in the literature—challenging the traditional theory of Partisan Political Cycles, which typically focuses on dependent variables such as economic growth, inflation, and unemployment. The study aims to assess whether the Party Political Cycles model, with its theoretical and methodological contributions, can account for the trajectory of income inequality. In this context, income inequality is framed as an economic factor that shapes the political process through its influence on the distribution of power. Methodologically, the research adopts a comparative approach, analyzing data from thirteen Latin American countries over the period from 1994 to 2013. The findings suggest that, among the traditional Partisan Political Cycles models, only the one using economic growth as the dependent variable demonstrates empirical support. However, when evaluating the explanatory power of the party model, this article provides empirical evidence indicating that partisan governance does indeed affect income inequality.
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