Afinal, Quais Instituições Importam? Equilíbrios Políticos, Concentração e Dispersão de Poder e Decisões
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Keywords

Political Institutions
institutionalism
polyarchies
positive theory
institutional design

How to Cite

Marenco, A. (2020). Afinal, Quais Instituições Importam? Equilíbrios Políticos, Concentração e Dispersão de Poder e Decisões. Political Observer | Revista Portuguesa De Ciência Política, (13), 87-104. https://doi.org/10.33167/2184-2078.RPCP2020.13/pp.87-104

Abstract

Institutions, was the answer presented by the positive theory, in the last three decades to explain the production of political equilibria. However, the following question is inevitable: Which institutional setting is most apt to produce stable political order and balance? Concentrated power based on the sovereign’s political virtues? Government divided into veto points that neutralize each other? This article revisits the literature that examines the effects produced by different institutional designs on stability and polyarchic performance, showing that there is no univocal and consensual connection between institutional configuration and generated results.

https://doi.org/10.33167/2184-2078.RPCP2020.13/pp.87-104
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