

A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of Russian Military Operations in Grozny and Kyiv

Uma análise comparativa preliminary das operações militares russas em Grozny e em Kyiv

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Abstract

The article aims at a comparative analysis of the Russian military operations in Kyiv, during the current war in Ukraine, and those carried out in Grozny, during the 1st Chechen War, namely from a discursive and operational standpoint, in order to highlight similarities and differences between both cases and clarify the comparisons used during the attempted siege of Kyiv. The analysis shows the existence of several similarities between the Russian invasion of Kyiv and that of Grozny, notwithstanding the end result, namely from the discursive, the Russian armed force's preparation and planning, the adversary's response and the invader's moral standpoints, as well as in the use of heavy artillery, namely against civilian populations. These similarities raise additional questions about the Russian armed force's loss of quality during the Putin era, following several military successes. Lastly, the use of this comparison served essentially to raise awareness in the public and in international institutions about what could happen in Kyiv (and in the rest of Ukraine) and to emphasise the need for support to Ukraine on the West's behalf.

Keywords: Chechnya; Grozny; invasion; Kyiv, Russia, Ukraine

Resumo

Centenas de anos de uma história conturbada transformaram a Ucrânia num país profundamente dividido. Juntamente com quase todas as nações eslavas, a Ucrânia tem tentado ajustar-se e aproximar-se de um sistema político-económico mais estável e seguro após a dissolução da URSS. Contudo, ao fazê-lo, despertou uma revisitação ao antigo sistema bipolar que muitos julgavam moribundo após o fim da Guerra Fria. Mas até que medida ele é antigo? A batalha entre o Ocidente e o Leste voltou a ver a luz. A Ucrânia é vista pela Federação Russa como um dos últimos bastiões para travar o avanço do Ocidente. A Rússia tem vindo a demonstrar sinais de um

imperialismo revivalista e um antagonismo profundo com relação às incursões ocidentais nas suas antigas repúblicas socialistas soviéticas. A Ucrânia encontra-se no limbo, balanceando os seus desejos com os do seu vizinho. Afirma-se pelo azul e amarelo da sua bandeira, pelo menos para já ou até quando conseguir.

Palavras-chave: Federação Russa; Influência; Território; Ucrânia

Introduction

In early March 2022, as clashes between Ukrainian and Russian forces raged near the Ukrainian capital, and a Russian military column tens of kilometres long was reported to be approaching Kyiv with the aim of encircling it, the then British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, stated that Russia might try to “groznify”¹ Kyiv...and reduce it to rubble’ (Johnson, 2022). This is just one of the people, among government officials, analysts and journalists, who predicted or feared Russian action in Kyiv similar to the operations in Grozny, Chechnya, during the wars there in the 1990s, known for their high and indiscriminate degree of destruction. In this sense, it is appropriate to analyse and clarify this comparison, considering its disparate nature in time and space. Thus, this article will compare the Kyiv campaign of 2022 and the Grozny campaign of 1994-1995, trying to emphasise the similarities and differences, with the aim of better understanding the aforementioned comparison, as well as to elucidate possible relevant evolutions in the Russian *modus operandi* over the last decades. To this end, the author will use a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources. Before proceeding to the body of the article, it should be noted that, with regard to the current events in Ukraine, there is uncertainty regarding the reliability of the available reports and data. This is a conflict where information and disinformation has been an active battleground, with each side seeking to filter, mould and frame the information that reaches the media. In order to better frame the comparison, a contextualisation of the Chechen Wars will follow, followed by the aforementioned analysis. This study will focus on the contextual, operational and narrative aspects, which will subsequently be summarised and analysed.

1. A brief contextualisation of the Chechen Wars

By 1991, Chechnya was not immune to the ethno-national upsurge being observed in the rest of the former USSR. Although the Chechen opposition, led by General Dzhokhar Dudayev, was initially in favour of Chechnya remaining within the USSR, the radicalisation of the Chechen Pan-National Congress changed the goal to one of full independence (Coene, 2010; Zürcher, 2007). After the attempted coup in Moscow in 1991, Dudayev was officially elected President. This electoral moment was denounced by Moscow as illegitimate and unconstitutional, so this did not deter Dudayev from immediately declaring the republic’s independence (Thomas, 1995a; Zürcher, 2010). (Thomas, 1995a; Zürcher, 2007). It is important, before continuing, to recall that the Chechen population (including the Ingush) has always had a very distinct identity, especially when contrasted with the Russian. In this regard, the uprisings against Russian imperial power in the 18th and 19th centuries can be emphasised. The conflicts in the 1990s can thus be seen as a continuation of an existing pattern of political and armed conflict between the Chechen peoples and the Russian power.

1. Translation into Portuguese of the expression *Grozny-fj*, by the author.

However, due to the poor integration of Chechens into Soviet power structures, the clan-based social structure of Chechnya, and the increasing influence of criminal gangs in the republic, the political and economic power structures in place were dismantled in the following years. The latter were poorly replicated by the Dudayev administration and divided between clans, criminal gangs and constantly diverging economic interests. Thus, mediating and managing these dynamics would occupy much of Dudayev's mandate, to the detriment of Chechnya's development (Cornell, 2001; de Waal, 2010; Zürcher, 2007). Added to this was the economic blockade by Moscow, which, while negotiating with Grozny, directly financed, armed and trained the opposition. This support culminated in a failed coup attempt in November 1994 and damaged the reputation of Boris Yeltsin, who saw no choice but to intervene directly in the country (Thomas, 1995a and 1995b).

The First Chechen War began on 11 December 1994 and was, by all accounts, a political and military failure for Moscow. In addition to being unmotivated, poorly equipped and commanded, Russian forces did not make a rapid advance to Grozny as planned and were constantly delayed, both on Chechen territory and in the neighbouring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. Terrain conditions, Chechen street-to-street and building-to-building combat tactics, and the active protest and resistance of the local inhabitants led Moscow to initiate systematic bombardments aimed at demotivating and surrendering the enemy. The media-driven broadcasting of the war and its atrocities had a negative effect on the Russian population, who watched live as their armed forces failed and their fellow citizens died. Despite the conquest of Grozny in early 1995, the war would continue, with the Chechens carrying out guerrilla operations from the mountains of the republic, and increasingly resorting to terrorist tactics, most notably the attack on 14 June 1995 in the town of Budennovsk in Stavropol (Coene, 2010; Cornell, 2001; Zürcher, 2007). In 1996, on the eve of presidential elections in Russia, popular fatigue called for an end to hostilities, which increased when, in August of that year, some 1,500 Chechen fighters surrounded 10,000 Russian soldiers in Grozny. On 31 August, Alexander Lebed of Moscow and Aslan Maskhadov of Chechnya (Dudayev was killed on 16 April 1996) signed a peace agreement that opened the door to a resolution of the conflict by 2001. The First Chechen War ended with an estimated 45,000 to 100,000 dead and the destruction of Grozny and many other localities (Coene, 2010; Zürcher, 2007).

The immediate history of this territory would be characterised by a continuing disintegration of political power which, without Dudayev, found itself unable to control the various existing factions, in turn undermining the security and economy of the republic. The arrival of many Sunni Wahhabi fighters also muted the Islamic element in the republic which, although it acted as an aggregating element to confront the Russian enemy, was generally observed in a Sufi manner. The effectiveness demonstrated by terrorist actions during WWI subsequently led to the spread of such actions, considerably increasing instability in Chechnya and the adjacent republics, itself increasingly eroding Grozny's authority (Schaefer, 2010; Zürcher, 2007). Russia intervened militarily in Chechnya again in 1999, under the newly elected Vladimir Putin. Unlike in 1994, Russian operations were carried out with greater professionalism and efficiency, but did not prevent the systematic bombardment of civilian populations. By March 2000, most of the republic had been conquered by the Russians, not without a high material and human price. As years before, the remnants of the Chechen resistance increasingly turned to terrorism, extending it to neighbouring

republics, most notably hostage-taking at School No. 1 in Beslan in 2004 (North Ossetia-Alania). However, the Second Chechen War, incorporating only the active phase of hostilities, ended up being concentrated between 1999 and 2002, the year consensually indicated as the end of the War, with around 50,000 to 80,000 people dying in this period. (Lopes, 2013; Schaefer, 2010).

2. Russian operations in Grozny and Kyiv compared

2.1. *A note on the Moscow narratives*

The actions taken by Russia from 24 February 2022 have been the subject of extensive and well-known justification, with Vladimir Putin reporting that ‘I have taken the decision to carry out a special military operation.... We will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine.... It is not our plan to occupy Ukrainian territory, we do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force.’ (Putin, 2022).

Similarly, the Russian invasion of Chechnya in 1994 was not considered as such. On 27 December 1994, days before the start of the battle of Grozny, Boris Yeltsin stated, *inter alia*:

The Chechen situation was having a destructive effect on Russia’s stability, had become one of the main internal threats to state security, and ...its intention was to ...restore order in the republic... Thus, the main mission of the armed forces was to disarm bandit formations and collect or destroy heavy weaponry. (Thomas *cit.* Yeltsin, 1995a, p. 236).

Additionally, Yeltsin had stated that the ongoing operations were aimed at restoring constitutional order (Russell, 2007). Russia was thus faced with an illegal government, which had not negotiated seriously with Moscow in the previous three years, and a republic that had become a centre for terrorists and criminals with links to the Chechen mafia. (Thomas, 1995a). In addition, several Russian officials in 1994 described the military operations as a peacekeeping mission aimed at quashing illegal armed formations (Baev, 1997; Thomas, 1995a and 1995b). It is interesting to note that in the Ukrainian case, Moscow also questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and criticised the Ukrainian authorities for never complying with the Minsk Agreements.

2.2 *Comparisons at the operational level*

Kyiv constituted one of Moscow’s four main targets at the beginning of the invasion (the others being Kharkiv, Donbass and Kherson), advancing into the city along both banks of the Dnipro River and entering the city’s suburbs on 25 February (ISW, 2022a). The aim seemed at the time to encircle Kyiv from the west, north-west and east, to prevent the capital’s access to the west of the country and to force the fall of the Ukrainian government (ISW, 2022b). The attempt to encircle Kyiv was countered by a strategy of using adjacent localities as a defensive ring around the capital, forcing the Russian army into a strategy of attrition, with the first clashes taking place in Borodyanka, Bucha, Vyshhorod and Chernihiv (ISW, 2022a). The Russian leadership’s ability to assess the situation was also affected by the Ukrainian use of electronic equipment, jeopardising communication between units and commands, causing disruption along the entire front. This allowed Ukrainian units to outflank the outnumbered but outmanoeuvred Russian forces, which were unable to consolidate their advance.



Figure 1: Map of Kyiv and adjacent localities (Source: Europa Technologies, 2018)

The problems faced refer to mistakes made at the operational level. Dalsjö et al. (2023) identify three errors in this regard: 1) poor coordination of logistics and supply lines, particularly in relation to refuelling and shortages of supplies; 2) failure to achieve air superiority; and 3) mismatch between air and ground forces. At the tactical level, the same authors determined that the Russian army was not well trained for the operations at hand, especially considering Russia's experience in urban conflicts from Grozny to Aleppo. This led to the use of heavy artillery, long-range missiles and air strikes. In this sense, the first reports of heavy artillery being deployed in this theatre of operations came on 27 and 28 February, days when Russian forces managed to enter Kyiv from the western side of Dnipro, but were unable to enter from the east, encountering strong resistance, despite the use of medium-long-range missiles on key military infrastructure such as railways and airports (ISW, 2022b).

By early March, several localities in the Kyiv suburbs, such as Irpin and Bucha, were surrounded or controlled, and the strategy at the time was to deprive the populations of access to the outside and force their surrender, while other localities were hit with artillery fire. At the same time, the resilience of Ukrainian forces led Russia to use this type of weaponry, starting to hit civilian targets (ISW, 2022c). Russian assaults into the centre of Kyiv proved to be disjointed, lacking synergy with each other and easily countered by the Ukrainians, so that by 3 March it was apparent that 'the conventional Russian military continues to perform poorly' (ISW, 2022d). Despite this, besieged towns such as Irpin were subjected to siege and starve tactics, i.e. attacking the town and preventing the inhabitants - civilians and military - from accessing any kind of foodstuffs (ISW, 2022e). From 8-9 March, Russian forces seemed to have changed their strategy, trying to consolidate control of the outskirts of Kyiv. It was also from this time that some of the aforementioned logistical problems were confirmed, namely the inability to resupply fuel, as well as the low morale of the troops (ISW, 2022c and 2022d). From the 10th, the Russian forces seem

to have entered a set of operational pauses, with the Ukrainian military leadership arguing that:

Russia has so far failed to achieve its territorial objectives...and will likely turn to attacking civilian targets.... Sporadic and uncoordinated offensive operations against key Ukrainian cities support the assessment...that Russian forces face growing supply and morale problems and have lost the initiative. (ISW, 2022g)

From the 17th, there was a change in the battle, with the Russians maintaining defensive positions and the Ukrainian forces beginning a counter-offensive, which gained pace from the 24th, and it was also from this moment that Russian attacks against civilian infrastructure and the population intensified, as well as the laying of mines along the disputed areas, perhaps preparing a partial 'scorched earth' policy. Thus:

Russian forces are increasingly shelling civilian infrastructure...in Kyiv and killing civilians.... The Ukrainian Army General Staff reported...that Russian forces continue to bomb and conduct airstrikes against residential areas 'to intimidate the civilian population and reduce Ukraine's economic potential.' (ISW, 2022h)

Towns such as Borodyanka were systematically bombed, with few buildings in the locality reportedly left intact (Goncharov, 2022). It was also from the second half of that month that some massacres (notably in Bucha) began to take place, although the precise timing is difficult to determine. (Higgins, 2022; HRW, 2022). Irpin was recaptured on 28 March (ISW, 2022i), and Russian forces began a partial withdrawal in the following days, continuing to undermine their previous positions during the withdrawal (ISW, 2022j). Thus, in early April, Russian offensive activities in and around Kyiv ended. The battle for Kyiv was declared over on 3 April (ISW, 2022k). Regarding the number of dead, there is still no consensus count.

In 1994, the Russian army began its campaign along three axes - North, East and West. (Oliker, 2001; Thomas, 1997) In 1994, the Russian army began its campaign along three axes - North, East and West (Oliker, 2001; Thomas, 1997), where on the second and third their march took them past the strongly anti-war republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. However, in the run-up to the invasion, the Russian army was already experiencing a panoply of operational problems, such as underfunding, lack of equipment or outdated equipment, and lack of human resources (both squares and officers). In general, there was a multidimensional lack of preparedness for conflict, notably in the ineffective composition of Russian forces (from different sectors of the security and defence apparatus), which themselves answered to a multitude of commands (from the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and the security services) that, without ever having collaborated in an operation of this nature, demonstrated poor communication and coordination throughout the campaign, even resulting in a high number of deaths due to friendly fire. (Oliker, 2001). Additionally, no military exercises had taken place since 1992, which, coupled with a lack of training in urban settings, resulted in a Russian inability to adjust the deployment of its forces to the Chechen scenario. Finally, Russian forces (and their commanders) believed that operations in Chechnya would be straightforward, leading to a general underestimation of the preparedness of the Chechen resistance and its quality, but also of the civilian contestation of the Russian presence itself (Oliker, 2001; Pilloni, 2000). On the ground, morale, which was reportedly high in the months leading up to the invasion, quickly faded. As the Russian forces advanced, they encountered local resistance along the western and eastern routes, and there were cases where Russian soldiers sympathised with the populations, even giving them directions on

how to sabotage Russian equipment. (Oliker, 2001; Thomas, 1995b). Even some Russian soldiers had refused to fulfil orders that, among other things, meant bombing civilian populations. Regarding the resistance encountered on the way to Grozny, the Russian forces:

They found...bridges closed and reinforced with concrete blocks, and some bridges...mined. Local inhabitants broadcast the location and actions of Russian troops via...radio. The local population was clearly prepared to take action against any intervening force (Thomas, 1995b, p. 271).

The Chechen resistance was composed of three rings, the first along the entire route to the suburbs of Grozny, consisting mainly of small villages, the second on the outskirts of Grozny, and the third corresponding to the capital itself. In the second and third ring, the Chechen forces forced the Russian army to fight block by block, causing more casualties than anticipated. The steadfastness of Chechen resistance, 'a matter of survival as a people and a race' (Thomas, 1995b, p. 274) demonstrates the aforementioned observations on the specificity of Chechen identity.

Armed resistance, also by the civilian population, ended up disrupting Russian action, given the Kremlin's orders not to attack civilians, creating a dissonance between strategic objectives and military doctrine. (Pilloni, 2000, p. 45). This precipitated the use of limited aerial bombardment to deter the population. In reality, the opposite occurred: 'for the Chechens every bomb that landed affirmed that Russia was an alien entity, an enemy with no other goal than the complete subjugation of the Chechen people' (Pilloni, 2000, p. 55). When this became apparent, military orders transitioned to more intense bombing of these localities on the way to the capital (Thomas, 1997). The situation escalated with violent assaults by Russian fighters, as well as assaults, rapes and killings of Chechens. In the village of Samashki, Russian forces perpetrated the massacre of one hundred civilians (Zürcher, 2007, p. 83). Also infamous were the camps set up to screen Chechen citizens, which were used as torture sites, including for Russian citizens (Pilloni, 2000; Thomas, 1997; Zürcher, 2007).



Figure 2: Map of Chechnya (Coene, 2010, p.50)

The Battle of Grozny began on 31 December, when the three military columns entered the city with the aim of capturing the main accesses to the city, critical infrastructure and Chechen government buildings, which was to culminate in the conquest of the presidential palace (Oliker, 2001). Expectations that Chechen resistance would be short-lived were dashed by the large number of fighters in the city. With the positional advantages associated with the defence of urban environments, Chechen forces quickly surrounded Russian units and destroyed their poorly constituted columns, with the result that hundreds of soldiers were reportedly killed in the first hours of the operation (Oliker, 2001; Thomas, 2001). (Oliker, 2001; Thomas, 1997). The slow advance was also due to orders from Yeltsin himself, who had expressly forbidden bombing the city, which consequently made it impossible to use air power as a complement to the ground advance. On the other side, as it turned out later, the Chechen forces were better equipped and prepared than estimated by Russian intelligence. Plans for the defence of Grozny had been underway for several months and included distribution of commands, zones of responsibility, training of local militias and implementation of communication networks. In terms of equipment, Grozny had acquired equipment such as Grad missile launchers, armoured vehicles and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry (Oliker, 2001).

Russian losses again precipitated the use of heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, initially confined to the city centre. On 5 January, and after a restructuring of forces, the Russian army resorted to Soviet tactics, 'devastating everything and everyone in its path...an extremely destructive process' (Pilloni, 2000, p. 53) This essentially harmed Russian citizens living in the city, as they, unlike the Chechens, had nowhere to run and nowhere to shelter (Thomas, 1997). This tactic was employed until the destruction and conquest of the presidential palace, Dudayev's centre of operations, on 26 January, whereupon the battle for the rest of the city continued over the next month, being even more destructive, and it may have helped that no Russians lived there. In the end, the bombing of Grozny was considered the worst in Europe since Dresden during World War II, resulting in 20,000 civilian deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees (Schaefer, 2010; Thomas, 1997; Zürcher, 2007).

2.3 *Similarities and Differences between Kyiv and Grozny*

Describing the military operations, several similarities can be identified. The first relates to the justification for the interventions - both were not described as wars - a special military operation - and a restoration of constitutional order, and both were justified in at least a disingenuous manner - disarming and denazifying Ukraine - and disarming illegal armed groups. These narratives served the purpose of avoiding designations of war - which would have meant having to respect the Law of War and its Conventions, as well as meaning a general Russian mobilisation. The common element in both cases is that of Russia's survival, an element that is an inseparable part of Russian strategic culture (Gaufman, 2021; Götz & Staun, 2022). The dilution between the national and the territorial, linked to an internal-external nexus and the perception of threats, be it NATO's eastward expansion or instability in a republic, both interpreted as a threat to the Russian nation, underpins this discourse, which thus emerges as a securitising act (Charap, Geist, Frederick, Drennan, Chandler, & Kavanagh, 2021; Götz & Staun, 2022). These arguments were not exclusive to Chechnya and Ukraine, but were also used during the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, and were further refined from the beginning of the Putin era.

At the operational level, the many similarities between 2022 and 1994 should be emphasised, firstly, the lack of proper planning. In both cases, there was a lack of situational assessment and up-to-date information about the enemy as well as the disposition of his forces. When the plans were implemented, the lack of communication made it difficult to adapt quickly to unfolding events. Similar problems can be observed at the planning level. While in 1994 this could be attributed to the poorer general condition of the Russian armed forces, coupled with the lack of training in urban environments, in 2022 the reason will be less clear. Indeed, the experiences of Grozny should have marked the training of troops over the last two decades. On the one hand, this problem can be attributed to the previously indicated poor planning (including in its supply lines), as well as to the Russian insistence on believing that the Ukrainian capital would fall in a few days. On the other hand, the difficulties imposed by Ukrainian tactics may have impacted Russian forces (Dalsjö et al., 2022).

Two other similarities should be emphasised, the first being the general underestimation of the enemy's capabilities, in terms of preparedness, military equipment and state of mind. In 1994, Chechen forces were more heavily fortified than expected, so Grozny had long-range equipment and even a (small) air force. As for Ukraine, Kyiv capitalised on the large military aid provided, mainly by the US, in the years before the Russian invasion. Sanders (2023), in his analysis of Ukrainian military reforms, argues that the adoption of a Western-style military reform brought Ukrainian forces to a high level of capability compared to NATO levels, giving it the resilience and flexibility to compete with the Russian enemy (Sanders, 2023).

Second, and as mentioned earlier, if Russian forces, or their generals, thought they would be welcomed in Ukraine and Chechnya, the reality showed otherwise, with active military and civilian resistance to Russian advances. In part, this resistance resulted in the more liberal use of heavy artillery, which made anti-Russian sentiment even greater. As mentioned, both populations saw this as an existential struggle, against a foreign and fundamentally hostile entity. The general morale of the Russian troops was also low, and while in the Chechen conflict this was due to the fact that they did not know exactly why they were there - especially since they were acting in their own country, and against a population of their country, in the Ukrainian case there was an equal lack of knowledge about what was at stake. In both cases, the high casualty figures negatively affected this situation.

Finally, the two interventions demonstrate the evolution of Russian military doctrine in the use of bombardment, both aerial and ground, and heavy artillery, although once again some similarities can be noted. Both Grozny and Kyiv were not subjected to indiscriminate bombardment in the early stages, demonstrating similar objectives - to surround the cities and force the fall of their governments. It was only when these objectives proved unattainable and Russian forces were drawn into more localised confrontations with greater resistance that these methods were used less judiciously.

Conclusion

Comparing the First Chechen War with the current conflict in Ukraine seems to be a rather irrelevant exercise, at least as long as the war in Ukraine continues. However, this article has attempted to compare an already relevant milestone of this conflict, the battle of Kyiv, with the battle of Grozny, albeit in a preliminary way. Even though they are areas with different history,

geography and size, the interventions had the same goal, the capitulation of the central government, and these interventions were initiated under insincere pretexts and disguised objectives. However, this preliminary analysis indicates that there are indeed similarities, some even unlikely, between the two campaigns. The adversary was underestimated and his own capacity overestimated, there was a lack of preparation and planning, both of the military corps and of the equipment, the campaigns were not well received by the local inhabitants, resistance was high and the number of casualties higher than expected and, as a result, Soviet tactics of razing the localities were used, if at first to force the capitulation of the populations, then to cancel out any risks to the Russian forces.

A second question deserves further analysis - it has been noted that Putin's entry signalled the beginning of a new phase of post-Soviet Russia, and from a military point of view, Russian operations, in Chechnya in 1999, Georgia in 2008 and Syria from 2015, known for a higher degree of efficiency, confirm this change. If so, one has to wonder why the Kyiv campaign did not meet with the same level of success. There is indeed a key additional factor, which was the international support given to Ukraine, notably in terms of arms supplies, added to an army reform carried out since 2016, and in terms of providing information on the state of the Russian army and its possible deployment on the ground. Even so, Western intelligence services reportedly did not expect such resistance from the Ukrainians. Similarly, Russia should have been aware of these factors, but something clearly failed in the case of Kyiv. Finally, the use of comparisons with Grozny essentially served, on the one hand, to justify the West's massive support for Ukraine in order to avoid a repetition of such events, to alert international institutions to the possibility of war crimes, and to sensitise populations to the damage this war could create. The analysis revealed that these comparisons go beyond the imagery that was attempted to be created, and that these battles, regardless of the outcome, had similar characteristics.

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